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POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: A
CONTROVERSIAL DEFENSE FOR VETERANS OF A
CONTROVERSIAL WAR
I saw flashes, flashes like incoming round hits, like fire crackers,
hearing machine guns, I heard machine guns, I heard rifle fire, I
heard more explosions and I couldn't move. I was happy because
I knew I was going to die.1
Vietnam was America's longest 2 and most controversial war.
One legacy of the Vietnam conflict is a veteran group suffering a
disproportionately high rate of psychological problems and crimi-
nal encounters. The incidence of suicide,4 alcoholism,5 and mortal-
ity6 among Vietnam veterans is significantly greater than for veter-
ans of other wars. Psychiatrists have attributed much of this
disparity to a particular combination of psychological symptoms
arising from the Vietnam experience. These symptoms are collec-
tively known as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Estimates vary, but as many as seventy percent of Vietnam vet-
erans suffer from some form of PTSD.7 Approximately twenty-five
1. State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 378 (La. 1982) (testimony of accused murderer Wayne
Felde).
2. American military presence in Vietnam continued from 1945 to 1975; large American
combat units were engaged from 1965 to 1973. Butterfield, Introduction, in THE VImrNAM
WAR: AN ALMANAC 8 (J. Bowman ed. 1985).
3. Three months after the 1968 Tet offensive, the'nation was split 42% opposed and 41%
in favor of the war. By November 1969, however, the ratio had changed to 55% opposed and
31% in favor of the war. G. HODGSON, AMERICA IN OUR TIME 384-85 (1976).
4. The suicide rate for Vietnam veterans is as much as 40% higher than that of their
nonveteran peers. Felde, 422 So. 2d at 377. It is 72% higher than that of the Vietnam-era
veteran who did not serve in Vietnam. A Post-Vietnam Pattern?, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1987,
at A5, col. 3.
5. The alcoholism rate for Vietnam veterans is 60% higher than that of World War H or
Korean War veterans. Felde, 422 So. 2d at 377. See Walker, The Psychological Problems of
Vietnam Veterans, 246 J. A.M.A. 781 (1981).
6. Vietnam veterans suffer a mortality rate 17 % higher than that of Vietnam-era veterans
who were not stationed in Vietnam. This includes a 93 % higher automobile accident fatality
rate and a 69% higher rate of accidental poisoning, mostly from drug overdoses. A Post
Vietnam Pattern?, supra note 4.
7. Wilson & Zigelbaum, The Vietnam Veteran on Trial: The Relation of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder to Criminal Behavior, 1 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 70 (1983).
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percent of all men in prison are Vietnam-era veterans.' As of 1981,
some 30,000 such veterans were imprisoned and another 375,000
were on probation, on parole, or awaiting trial.9 Inasmuch as PTSD
may be affecting these veterans' concept of reality, the appropri-
ateness of PTSD as a criminal defense must be addressed.
This Note reviews the viability of PTSD as a criminal defense
from several perspectives. It discusses the historical background of
war-related mental disturbances, the emergence of PTSD as a rec-
ognized mental disorder, and the impact of the PTSD defense on
state, federal, and military justice systems. The analysis empha-
sizes the relationship between PTSD and the insanity defense and
considers various PTSD-related evidentiary problems.
THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE
The post-war psychological problems plaguing the Vietnam vet-
eran have been attributed at least partially to the unusual charac-
teristics of the war itself.10 The Vietnam-era soldier was younger
than combatants of previous wars1 and participated individually
rather than as a part of a cohesive unit. Soldiers often arrived
aboard commercial aircraft, joined a unit in the field for twelve or
thirteen months, and then returned individually to the United
States. 2 Unit and leader loyalty consequently were limited.13
8. Felde, 422 So. 2d at 377.
9. Smith, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder-An Often Overlooked Element of Trauma,
TRIAL, Feb. 1984, at 92, 96. U.S. Bureau of Prisons data show that veteran inmates, unlike
their nonveteran counterparts, generally have no history of prior imprisonment. This fact
suggests that their criminal behavior is linked to their Vietnam experience. Id. See gener-
ally R. MASON, CHICKENHAWK (1983) (relating a former Vietnam helicopter pilot's inexplica-
ble involvement with crime).
10. See Horowitz & Solomon, A Prediction of Delayed Stress Response Syndrome in Vi-
etnam Veterans, 31 J. Soc. ISSUES 67, 69-70 (1975); Lipkin, Scurfield & Blank, Post-Trau-
matic Stress Disorder in Vietnam Veterans: Assessment in a Forensic Setting, 1 BEHAv.
SCL & L. 51, 54 (1983); Walker, supra note 5, at 781; Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disor-
der-Opening Pandora's Box?, 17 NEw ENG. L. REv. 91, 99-100 (1981-1982). See generally
H. SUMMERS, JR., ON STRATEGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM WAR (1982) (failure of
military strategy in Vietnam and resultant effect on American populace).
11. The average age of American soldiers in Vietnam was 19.2 years, whereas the average
age of American soldiers in World War II was 26 years. Lyons, Vietnam Veterans Turn to
Therapy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1984, at C6, col. 3.




The United States government's apparent desire to contain
rather than win the war, coupled with nonexistent battle lines and
repetitive battles for previously seized and relinquished territory,
caused soldiers to become disillusioned and uncommitted. 14 The
lack of home front support and the frustrations inherent in fight-
ing a guerrilla war exacerbated the problem.
After surviving a Vietnam tour of duty, the Vietnam veteran did
not enjoy a "cooling-off" period as had the World War II and Ko-
rean War veterans. 15 Instead, he returned to the "hostile, critical or
disinterested responses of strangers, friends and family."'" The
American public increasingly stigmatized veterans in light of me-
dia reports relating combatants' mass insubordination and drug
use. 1 7 Public support further dwindled in the face of atrocities such
as My Lai.18 Many veterans became embittered and began to mis-
trust the government that had sent them to fight such an unpopu-
lar war."9 This resultant mistrust of authority figures contributed
to the veteran's reluctance to seek psychological assistance.20
POST-COMBAT REACTIONS-A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Despite the unique circumstances of the Vietnam conflict,
postcombat reactions are not a new problem. The medical world
has long recognized that combat produces dysfunctional psycholog-
14. Walker, supra note 5, at 781.
15. Returning World War II and Korean War soldiers spent several weeks on troop ships
with military personnel sympathetic to their difficulties in readjusting to a civilian lifestyle
after months of combat. The time aboard the ships provided time for transition between
combat and civilization.
16. Lipkin, Scurfield & Blank, supra note 10, at 54. See generally Dean & Lin, The
Stress-Buffering Role of Social Support, 165 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 403 (1977).
17. For example, Robert D. Heinl of the Detroit News, published a 1971 article stating
"[B]y every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state of
approaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or having refused combat, murdering
their officers and noncommissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near-mu-
tinous." Heinl, The Collapse of the Armed Forces, 19 ARMED FORCES J. 30 (1971), cited in
G. LEWY, AMERICAN IN VIETNAM 154 (1978).
18. On 16 March 1968 an infantry company of the Americal Division assaulted the
Vietnamese hamlet of My Lai, systematically killing all the inhabitants. The population
consisted mainly of old men, women, and children, and the final body count was as high as
200. G. LEWY, supra note 17, at 325-26.
19. Note, supra note 10, at 99-100.
20. Walker, supra note 5, at 781. Of those veterans who sought assistance, the majority
were misdiagnosed. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
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ical and behavioral reactions. The American recognition of combat
fatigue officially dates from the Civil War, when the mental disor-
der was labeled "nostalgia."'" Commentators attribute the rela-
tively low psychiatric rate of the Civil War to various factors, such
as fighting in the soldiers' own country, living conditions similar to
those at home, unsophisticated weaponry, and desertion as a ready
alternative to fighting.22
The massive artillery bombardments of World War I often in-
flicted severe concussions on soldiers' brains. Psychiatrists aptly la-
beled the resultant psychological breakdown "shell shock. '23 Psy-
chiatrists attributed other psychiatric casualties to hysterical
reactions resulting from the use of poison gas24 or simply from
cowardice.25 Upon entering the war, the United States pioneered a
program of forward treatment. Under this program, the military
assigned a psychiatrist to each division and treated psychiatric cas-
ualties as close to the front lines as possible, with the expectation
of returning as many soldiers as possible to their units. 6
In World War II, the United States military initially failed to
apply the forward treatment techniques pioneered during World
War I. Shortly after the 1942 invasion of North Africa, American
combatants were evacuated for battle fatigue faster than they
could be replaced. During the course of the war, the military
granted 500,000 service discharges for psychiatric reasons. 2 The
21. The Union Surgeon General, William Hammonds, first recognized this condition. In
the first year of the war, 5213 cases of nostalgia were reported-2.34 cases per 1000 soldiers.
This rate rose to 3.3 per 1000 by the second year. In addition, 20.8 per 1000 soldiers were
discharged for "paralysis" and 6 per 1000 for "insanity." P. BOURNE, MEN STRESS AND VIET-
NAM 9-10 (1970) (citing Deutsch, Military Psychiatry: The Civil War, in ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY 376-77 (1944)).
22. Chermol, Wounds Without Scars: Treatment of Battle Fatigue in the U.S. Armed
Forces in the Second World War, MILITARY AFFAIRS, Jan. 1985, at 9.
23. P. BOURNE, supra note 21, at 6. The presence of blood in the spinal fluid of several
such casualties supported this theory. Id.
24. After the German army introduced gas warfare, the ratio of psychiatric to physical
casualties in Allied ground forces exceeded two to one; that is, there were two "hysterical"
reactions to every actual gas casualty. Chermol, supra note 22, at 9.
25. P. BOURNE, supra note 21, at 11.
26. Id. at 13. While in use, this program returned 65% of psychiatric casualties to their
units. Id. (citing Salmon, The War Neuroses and Their Lessons, 109 N.Y.J. MED. 993-94
(1919)).
27. Chermol, supra note 22, at 9.
28. P. BOURNE, supra note 21, at 15.
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rate of psychiatric casualties was as high as 101 per 1000 in some
units.29 Not until March 1944 did psychiatrists appear regularly at
the division level.30
The temporal proximity of World War II to the Korean and Vi-
etnam conflicts encouraged the military to retain the lessons
learned and therefore contributed to considerably lower psychiat-
ric casualty figures in these later wars.31 The relatively low psychi-
atric casualty rate in Vietnam reflected the quality and availability
of psychiatric services, 32 improved training, confidence in leader-
ship, the sporadic nature of the fighting, and a twelve- to thirteen-
month rotation policy.3 3 As the war grew unpopular and the mili-
tary experienced severe racial and disciplinary problems, 4 how-
ever, psychiatric casualties increased dramatically. 5
The psychiatric community was largely unresponsive to this
trend. The original 1952 edition of the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders (DSM I) categorized combat stress as a gross stress reaction. 6
This categorization disappeared in the 1968 edition (DSM I1).31
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Psychiatric casualties suffered annually by U.S. armed forces averaged 37 per 1000 in
Korea and 12 per 1000 in Vietnam. Id. at 15 (citing Tiffany & Allerton, Army Psychiatry in
the Mid-60's, 123 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 810-21 (1967)).
32. Id. at 18. A psychiatrist was assigned to the staff of the Chief Army Surgeon in Viet-
nam, every division included a psychiatrist, and both field and evacuation hospitals pro-
vided psychiatric care. Id. at 19. In October 1962, with only 8000 advisors stationed in Viet-
nam, the first U.S. Army psychiatrist reported for duty. Jones & Johnson, Jr., Medical and
Psychiatric Treatment Policy and Practice in Vietnam, 31 J. Soc. ISSUES 49 (1975).
33. J. COLEMAN, J. BUTCHER & R. CARSON, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 172
(6th ed. 1980). Knowing that he could look forward to a definite end to the stressful situa-
tion appeared to make the soldier's tour more bearable. Id.
34. Conviction rates for insubordination, mutiny, and other acts involving willful refusal
to perform a lawful order increased from .28 per 1,000 in 1968 to .44 per 1,000 in 1970. G.
LEWY, supra note 17, at 157. Violence involving use of hand grenades against officers and
noncommissioned officers, known as "fragging," rose from 126 incidents in 1969 (.35 per
1,000) to 333 in 1971 (1.75 per 1,000). The reported deaths from these fraggings were 37 in
1969, but only 12 in 1971. Id. at 156.
35. Army neuropsychiatric cases doubled between 1965 and 1970, with the overall rate for
psychiatric problems standing at 24 per 1000 in 1970. Id. at 160.
36. J. CARD, LIvEs AFTER VIETNAM 103 (1983) (discussing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (1st ed. 1952)).
37. Id. (discussing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968)).
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DSM 11 considered combat stress only under the general heading
of "adjustment reactions of adult life."'3  This cursory treatment of
a serious and widespread disorder indicates that the psychiatric
community did not adequately address problems associated with
post-combat stress reactions when the American military presence
in Vietnam was at its peak. 39 The medical and legal professions
lacked an adequate description of PTSD symptoms that could be
used to diagnose, treat, and defend veterans.40 As a result, psychia-
trists frequently misdiagnosed the postwar reactions of many Viet-
nam veterans as psychotic, substance dependent, or fictional.41
38. Id.
39. U.S. troop strength peaked at 542,000 in January 1969. G. LEWY, supra note 17, at
147.
40. Erlinder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Vietnam Veterans and the Law: A Chal-
lenge to Effective Representation, 1 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 25, 28 (1983). A number of earlier
cases reflect veterans' attempts to explain their PTSD-type symptoms. E.g., Bradley v.
United States, 447 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1971) (World War II veteran, previously diagnosed as
suffering from shell shock resulting in anxiety neurosis, involved in bank robbery) vacated,
404 U.S. 567 (1971); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979) (Vietnam veteran suffer-
ing from traumatic neurosis and alcoholism claimed blackout during shooting); People v.
Danielly, 33 Cal. 2d 362, 202 P.2d 18 (1949) (World War II veteran, previously diagnosed as
suffering from psychoneurosis neurasthenia, claimed no recollection of shooting wife), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949); People v. Walker, 33 Cal. 2d 250, 201 P.2d 6 (1948) (World War
II veteran claimed insanity in murder case due to war experience), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 940
(1949); People v. Gilberg, 197 Cal. 306, 240 P. 1000 (1925) (World War I shell shock); People
v. Lisnow, 88 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 21, 151 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1978) (Vietnam veteran attempted
to explain unprovoked attack on maitre d' by reference to lapse of memory and dream-like
experiences of Vietnam); Krooner v. State, 137 Conn. 58, 78 A.2d 51 (1950) (World War II
veteran, previously hospitalized for battle fatigue, alleged he "dimmed out" during stab-
bing); Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743, 328 N.E.2d 833 (1975) (twice-wounded
Vietnam veteran, previously hospitalized for shell shock, fled scene of shooting when he
imagined himself back in Vietnam); Commonwealth v. Logan, 361 Pa. 186, 63 A.2d 28 (1949)
(World War II veteran, previously shell shock casualty, claimed blackout during shooting);
Edwards v. State, 540 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. 1976) (Vietnam veteran claimed insanity in shoot-
ing death of sister), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977); Harvey v. State, 225 Tenn. 316, 468
S.W.2d 731 (1971) (Vietnam veteran alleged dissociative state due to combat in defense of
charges of joyriding and reckless driving), rev'd, 407 U.S. 901 (1972); Kemp v. State, 61 Wis.
2d 125, 211 N.W.2d 793 (1973) (Vietnam veteran shot wife while dreaming he was being
attacked by Viet Cong).
41. Erlinder, supra note 40, at 28. In 1976, a psychological study reported that 77% of
Vietnam veterans admitted to VA hospitals were misdiagnosed as schizophrenic. J. BRENDE
& E. PARSONS, VIETNAM VETERANS 76 (1985). PTSD is easily confused with schizophrenia,
antisocial personality disorder, and an atypical psychosis (hysterical neurosis). Walker &
Cavenar, Jr., Vietnam Veterans: Their Problems Continue, 170 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DIS-
EASE 174, 175 (1982).
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The 1980 edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Di-
agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM III)
recognized PTSD as a subcategory of anxiety disorders.42 DSM III
characterized PTSD as the development of specific symptoms fol-
lowing a psychologically traumatic event that is beyond the range
of usual human experience.43 PTSD is not limited to veterans; it
may develop in victims of traumatic events such as rape, assault,
airplane crashes, and torture.44 The traumatic event, or "stressor,"
is defined as an event that would generate symptoms of distress in
virtually anyone exposed to it. 45
For Vietnam veterans, PTSD symptoms include combat flash-
backs, intense memories or recurrent dreams of the traumatic
event, or the feeling that the stressor is reoccurring.46 The PTSD
diagnostic criteria include a numbing of responsiveness to the
outside world, evidenced by diminished interest in significant ac-
tivities, feelings of detachment or estrangement, or repressed emo-
tions.47 The criteria also require that at least two of the following
symptoms be new developments in the patient's behavior after en-
countering the stressor: hyperalertness, sleep disturbance, survivor
guilt, memory impairment, avoidance of activities reminiscent of
the trauma, and intensification of symptoms after exposure to
stimuli resembling the stressor."
A few Vietnam veterans have reported flashbacks in which they
re-live traumatic events and behave accordingly. These flashbacks
may occur immediately after the traumatic event or not until years
later.49 A flashback can last for several minutes or several days.5
Associated symptoms include depression, anxiety, and unpredict-
42. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM III].
43. Id. at 236-38.
44. Id. at 236.
45. Id. at 238.
46. Walker, supra note 5, at 782. Spouses of veterans have reported that their husbands
scream or strike them while asleep. Id.
47. DSM III, supra note 42, at 238.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 236. See also Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 7, at 73-74.
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able explosions of aggressive or impulsive behavior involving sud-
den trips, unexplained absences, or changes in lifestyle.5' Psycholo-
gists have observed several patterns of psychic-state responses in
the PTSD sufferer.52
PTSD AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE
PTSD may affect the sufferer's understanding of reality, his per-
ception of surrounding circumstances, and his reaction to other-
wise normal events. These symptoms raise questions concerning
the PTSD victim's ability to possess the requisite criminal intent
and whether PTSD can qualify as an insanity type defense. In-
sanity defenses, however, have been subject to frequent criticism.53
Although PTSD has received a mixed reception in the legal com-
munity,54 it has achieved some success as a legal defense.5 5 Viet-
nam veterans have used PTSD successfully as an insanity defense
against charges of murder, 56 attempted murder, 57 kidnapping,58
51. DSM III, supra note 42, at 237.
52. Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 7, at 72-73. PTSD may be divided into the following
nine subsyndromes: depression and suicidal, isolation and withdrawal, sensation seeking,
paranoid, profound psychic numbing, alienation and cynicism, problem with intimacy, fu-
sion of stress syndrome with pre-morbid disposition syndrome, and prosocial-humanitarian.
Id.
53. See Clanon, Shawver & Kurdys, Less Insanity in the Courts, 68 A.B.A. J. 824 (1982).
The insanity acquittal of attempted assassin John Hinckley outraged the American public.
An ABC News poll indicated that 76% of the public believed an injustice had occurred, and
public officials called for modification or abolition of the insanity defense. T. MAEDER, CRIME
AND MADNESS xiii-xiv (1985).
54. The PTSD defense has divided judges, psychiatrists, and veterans. Viet War Trauma
Grows as Defense in Criminal Cases, L.A. Daily J., May 27, 1985, at 1, col. 6. Prosecutors
view PTSD as potentially fraudulent. Burke, The 'Bombshell' Defense, Nat'l Law J., May
12, 1980, at 1, col. 1. See Kurtz, Vietnam Veterans' Nonstop Con Game, N.Y. Times, Mar.
10, 1986, at 19, col. 2. Psychiatrists, however, claim that PTSD now has the acceptance of
the entire psychiatric community and consequently deserves courtroom credibility. Burke,
supra, at 1, col. 3.
55. In its first five years of use, the PTSD defense has helped at least 250 Vietnam veter-
ans get shorter sentences, treatment instead of jail, or acquittals. Viet War Trauma Grows
as Defense in Criminal Cases, supra note 54, at 1, col. 6.
56. Erlinder, supra note 40, at 33-35 (citing State v. Heads, No. 106-126 (1st Jud. Dist.
Ct. Caddo Parish La. Oct. 10, 1981)). But see State v. Sharp, 418 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1982).
57. Vietnam Vet Acquitted Of Shooting, VETERANS RIGHTS NEWSLETrER, July-Aug. 1982,
at 19 (citing State v. Wood, No. 80-7410 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill., May 4, 1982)).
58. PTSD Successful in Insanity Defense, VETERANS RIGHTS NEWSLETTER, July-Aug.
1983, at 1 (citing People v. Parish, No. 82-32052 (Cir. Ct. Genesee County Mich. Mar. 4,
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and drug smuggling. 9 PTSD has also been used to mitigate
sentences in convictions for crimes such as drug dealing, 0 man-
slaughter,61 assault with intent to commit murder,62 and even tax
fraud.63 In light of the relative rarity of the insanity defense in
general and the unlikelihood of its success, 64 the success of PTSD
as an insanity defense is intriguing.
To determine whether an accused was insane at the time he
committed an offense, courts commonly apply one of three
tests-the M'Naghten rule,6 5 the irresistible impulse addition to
the M'Naghten rule, 6 and some version of the American Law In-
stitute (ALI) Model Code definition of insanity.67 The M'Naghten
rule, also known as the "all or none" rule,68 requires a finding that
1983)). Cf. Stader v. State, 453 N.E.2d 1032 (Ind. 1983) (veteran found guilty but mentally
ill for wrongful confinement of another while armed with a deadly weapon).
59. See Note, supra note 10, at 111-13 (discussing United States v. Tindall, No. 79-376
(D. Mass., Sept. 19, 1980)).
60. See Lauter, Vietnam Stress Defense in Virginia Case Produces Light Jail Term for
Drug Dealing, Nat'l Law J., Nov. 16, 1981, at 7, col. 2.
61. People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 497 N.E.2d 1138 (1986) (PTSD used as a mitigating
factor to reduce sentence to statutory minimum).
62. State v. Spawr, 653 S.W.2d 404 (Tenn. 1983) (evidence of PTSD and rehabilitation
gained probationary hearing).
63. See Holzberg, Post-Vietnam Stress Claim Frees Vet in Tax Case, Nat'l Law J., Dec.
28, 1981, at 3, col. 2. But see State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 337 S.E.2d 786 (1985) (PTSD used
to increase sentence).
64. The insanity defense is used less than once in every 1000 criminal cases. Only 4 to 5%
of these cases result in a verdict of innocent by reason of insanity. T. BLAU, THE PSYCHOLO-
GIST AS EXPERT WITNESS 87 (1984). The National Commission on the Insanity Defense re-
ported that the insanity plea was used rarely and that acquittals were extremely rare. NA-
TIONAL COMM'N ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, MYTHS & REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 14 (1983). As an illustration, in Virginia less than 1%
of the felony cases involve the insanity defense, and acquittals number no more than 15 per
year. Id. at 15.
65. See M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
66. See Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 70 S.E.2d 284 (1952).
67. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Official Draft 1962). See also T. BLAU, supra note 64,
at 84. Twenty-six states use some version of the ALI standard, twenty-two use the
M'Naghten rule, and the remaining two, Idaho and Montana, have eliminated the innocent
by reason of insanity plea altogether. Id. at 85-86. Four of the states using the M'Naghten
rule also use some version of the irresistible impulse test. Id. Following the passage of the
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 20 (Supp. III 1985), federal courts have
substantially adopted the M'Naghten rule. After a brief period of deviation, the military
essentially has returned to the M'Naghten rule. See S. Res. 2638, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132
CONG. REc. H10,170 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986).
68. T. BLAU, supra note 64, at 84.
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a person suffers from a disease that renders cognition and volition
clearly defective.6 9 The irresistible impulse addition to the
M'Naghten rule adopted an additional volition test. Under this
standard a party is considered insane if he knew what he was doing
and that it was wrong, but his actions were beyond his control due
to the presence of some mental disease. 0
In 1961, the ALI adopted a new definition of legal insanity as
part of its Model Penal Code. 71 The ALI definition expanded the
M'Naghten rule by inquiring whether the accused understood the
criminal nature of his act and whether he was able to conform his
conduct to legal requirements. 2
The PTSD Defense Under State Law
A substantial minority of the states use some version of the ALI
insanity definition,73 and a few states employ the irresistible im-
pulse test,74 but the majority of state courts follow the stricter
M'Naghten insanity standard.76 Regardless of the standard ap-
plied, PTSD should prove a legitimate defense. The veteran who
believes he is again in combat and attacks one whom he believes to
be an enemy soldier is insane under the M'Naghten right-wrong
test.7 '6 This veteran is also insane under the ALI standard due to
his incapacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. 77 The
PTSD defense could also frustrate the prosecutor's attempt to
69. Id. The M'Naghten test requires that "[t]o establish a defense on the ground of in-
sanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it; that he did not
know what he was doing was wrong." Id.
70. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 223-24 [hereinafter SENATE REPORTI, re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 3182, 3405-06.
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01.
72. T. BLAU, supra note 64, at 84. The Model Penal Code states: "A person is not respon-
sible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01.
73. T. BLAU, supra note 64, at 84-86.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Milstein & Snyder, PTSD: The War Is Over, The Battles Go On, TRIAL, Jan. 1983, at
86-87.
77. Id at 87-88.
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prove sufficient mens rea or specific intent 8 and would prove ben-
eficial to the convicted PTSD sufferer seeking a sentence reduc-
tion 7 9 or post-conviction hearing.8 0
The PTSD defense has been successful in states that apply vari-
ous insanity standards."1 A Louisiana court, using a M'Naghten
modified insanity test, acquitted a former Marine of murder in
State v. Heads."2 The accused had experienced extensive combat
as a point man in long-range reconnaissance patrols in Vietnam.
After returning home he suffered a flashback following a stressful
marital breakup and killed his brother-in-law. 83 The defense con-
vinced the jury that Head's combat flashback had destroyed his
ability to distinguish right from wrong.8 4 The defense successfully
argued that the stress of losing his family, coupled with the simi-
larity of the shooting scene to Vietnam, caused the normally law-
abiding veteran to go "on automatic" and revert to combat-like
behavior.8 5
78. Id. at 88.
79. See Vet With PTSD Convicted of Lesser Offense in Retrial, VETERANS RIGHTS NEWS-
LETTER, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 1 (citing People v. Cohea, No. 24082 (Sup. Ct. Contra Costa
County Cal. 1983)); State v. Twelves, 463 So. 2d 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (court consid-
ered evidence of PTSD in suspending all but 18 months of 10-year sentence).
80. See State v. Spawr, 653 S.W.2d 404 (Tenn. 1983) (new probationary hearing granted
due to PTSD).
81. See Erlinder, supra note 40, at 33-35 (discussing State v. Heads, No. 106-126 (1st
Jud. Dist. Ct. Caddo Parish La. Oct. 10, 1981) (defendant found insane under modified
M'Naghten test)); Vietnam Veteran Acquitted, Nat'l L.J., June 29, 1981, at 4, col. 3 (citing
State v. Cocdzza, No. 1484-79 (Sup. Ct. Middlesex Cty N.J. 1981) (defendant found insane
under M'Naghten test)); Vietnam Vet With PTSD Innocent of Attempted Murder, VETER-
ANS RIGHTS NEWSLETTER, Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 37 (citing State v. Mann, No. 82-CR-310 (Cir.
Ct. Marinette Cty Wisc. Aug. 1983) (ALI)). But see Briggs v. State, 18 Ark. App. 292, 715
S.W.2d 223 (1986) (trial judge did not specifically discuss ALI standard but denied jury
instructions on insanity on grounds that testimony indicated defendant could tell right from
wrong).
82. See Erlinder, supra note 40, at 33-35 (discussing Heads).
83. Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 7, at 73-74. Heads, reportedly perceiving his brother-
in-law as a Viet Cong, pulled a rifle from his car, shot the victim through the eye and then
"stalked the ranch house as though it were a straw hooch." War Echoes in the Courts,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1981, at 103.
84. War Echoes in the Courts, supra note 83, at 103.
85. Erlinder, supra note 40, at 34.
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In State v. Wood,8" an Illinois jury applied the ALI standard and
found that an ex-Marine who had suffered a PTSD flashback was
not guilty of attempted murder by reason of insanity.8 7 Wood
claimed that the physical similarities of his factory workplace and
his artillery base in Vietnam initiated a flashback that culminated
in the shooting of his foreman. 8 At the time of the shooting, coun-
sel argued, Wood was reliving Vietnam."9
A Michigan court, using a modified ALI standard, also found a
Vietnam veteran not guilty by reason of insanity. In People v. Par-
ish,90 the accused had seized his sister-in-law and her husband and
forced them at knife-point to take him to his estranged wife and
children. Despite conflicting expert testimony about Parish's con-
dition, the jury acquitted him of the kidnapping charge. 1
In Commonwealth v. Mulcahy,92 a Marine veteran was convicted
of a lesser included offense. Charged with murdering a stranger
over a dispute with a bar waitress, Mulcahy claimed he could not
remember shooting his victim.93 The defense presented a videotape
of Mulcahy reliving his Vietnam trauma while under sodium
86. Erlinder, supra note 40, at 35-37 (citing State v. Wood, No. 80-7410 (Cir. Ct. Cook
Cty Ill. May 5, 1982)).
87. The jury's verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" did not specify whether the
verdict was rendered because the defendant could not "substantially appreciate the crimi-
nality of his acts" or because he could not "conform his conduct to the law." Erlinder, supra
note 40, at 36-37.
88. The heat and humidity, the assembly plant's floor (metal matting floor) and the loud
noises resembled Wood's former artillery base in Vietnam. Vietnam Vet Acquitted of
Shooting, supra note 57, at 19.
89. Id. Cf. Burke, Vietnam Stress Defense a Winner in Drug Case, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 6,
1980, at 4, col. 1 (citing United States v. Tindall, No. 79-376 (D. Mass. Sept. 1980) (former
helicopter pilot acquitted of drug smuggling)). Although Tindall did not claim to have ex-
perienced flashbacks, he was diagnosed as suffering from an "action addiction," brought
about by his combat experiences, that forced him to live life "on the edge." Id. Tindall's
behavior illustrates the sensation-seeking syndrome common among PTSD sufferers. He
and his former crew members conducted the smuggling as a military operation, and they
maintained role relationships that were similar to their Vietnam combat duties. Wilson &
Zigelbaum, supra note 7, at 74. But cf. United States v. Krutschewski, 541 F. Supp. 142 (D.
Mass. 1982) (Vietnam veteran member of Tindall's operation convicted).
90. PTSD Successful in Insanity Defense, supra note 58, at 1 (citing Parish, No. 82-
32052 (Cir. Ct. Genesee Cty Mich. Mar. 4, 1983)).
91. Id.




pentathol. The videotape established that at the time of the shoot-
ing, Mulcahy believed he was experiencing a rocket attack in Long
Binh, Vietnam. 4 The court found Mulcahy guilty only of
manslaughter. 5
The PTSD Defense in the Federal Courts
Prior to Congress' October 12, 1984, enactment of the Insanity
Defense Reform Act of 1984,96 the vast majority of federal courts
followed the ALI standard. 97 The 1984 Act worked three changes
on the insanity defense in the federal courts. First, the federal sys-
tem now limits the insanity defense to severe mental diseases or
defects. The mental defect must be of such severity as to make the
accused "unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrong-
fulness of his acts."'98 Second, the 1984 Act eliminates the voli-
tional portion of the cognitive-volitional test99 and the diminished-
responsibility defense. 100 This change effectively resurrects the
M'Naghten rule in the federal courts. Federal defendants who ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of their acts but lack the capacity to
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law therefore will
not be able to use the insanity defense.'10 Finally, the 1984 Act
places on the defendant the burden of proving his insanity by clear
and convincing evidence. 02
94. Id. at 26, col. 3.
95. Id.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 20 (Supp. III 1985).
97. Lefcourt & Becker, The New Insanity Defense and Mental Condition Defenses, in
MENs REA 347, 354 (1985); see also United States v. Frederick, 3 M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1977)
(U.S. Court of Military Appeals adopts ALI standard). But see United States v. Lyons, 731
F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984) (specifically rejecting ALI standard), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 930
(1984).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 20(a) (Supp. III 1985). The statute reads, in part, "[I]t is an affirmative
defense ... that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the
defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the
nature and quality of the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not other-
wise constitute a defense." Id.
99. Lefcourt & Becker, supra note 97, at 356.
100. Diminished responsibility, also known as partial insanity, allows the trier of fact to
consider the defendant's impaired mental state in mitigation of sentence and degree of of-
fense. It does not, however, rise to the level of insanity. BLACK'S LAW DiC'IONARY 412 (5th
ed. 1979).
101. Lefcourt & Becker, supra note 97, at 358.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 20(b) (Supp. II 1985).
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At least three federal district courts and one federal appeals
court have held that the insanity standard is substantive in nature
and cannot be applied retroactively.' s Courts have also held that
shifting the burden of proof from the prosecution to the accused is
substantive, therefore prohibiting retroactive application.' 4 In ad-
dition, courts have held that the Act's assignment of the burden of
proof does not violate the fifth amendment's due process clause.10 5
Federal courts, in deciding United States v. Pricket'016 and United
States v. Mest,107 held that the Act's prohibition of expert testi-
mony on the ultimate legal issue of insanity may be applied retro-
actively without violating the ex post facto clause. 08
A pivotal question in the use of the PTSD insanity defense
before a federal court is whether PTSD qualifies as a severe mental
disease or defect under the 1984 Act. Congress's purpose in impos-
ing the severity requirement was to ensure that nonpsychotic be-
havior disorders or neuroses such as inadequate personality, imma-
ture personality, and pattern of antisocial tendencies would not
suffice as defenses. 09 Congress also intended to exclude voluntary
drug or alcohol abuse as a valid defense, even though such abuse
might have prevented an accused from appreciating the nature and
quality of his conduct. 10
The federal courts have not determined a standard for the sever-
ity requirement."' As a minimum, however, a PTSD dissociative
103. Lefcourt & Becker, supra note 97, at 358. See, e.g., United States v. Mest, 789 F.2d
1069, 1073 n. 3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 163 (1986); United States v. Kowal, 596 F.
Supp. 375, 378 (D. Conn. 1984).
104. Mest, 789 F.2d at 1073 n. 3.
105. United States v. Amos, 803 F.2d 419 (8th Cir., 1986).
106. 604 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Ohio, 1985), af'd, 790 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1986).
107. 789 F.2d 1069 (4th Cir.).
108. Id. at 1071. Limiting expert testimony with respect to a defendant's mental state
does not require any less testimony for conviction, but merely changes the style of question
and answer that may be used. Id.
109. SENATE REPORT, supra note 70, at 229, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3182, 3411. PTSD coupled with secondary symptoms such as neurosis or psychosis
arguably may establish the requisite severe mental disease or defect. Bancroft, Post-Trau-
matic Stress Disorders and Brainwashing as State of Mind Defense in Criminal and Civil
Fraud Cases, in MENS REA 211, 217 (1985).
110. SENATE REPORT, supra note 70, at 229, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3182, 3411.
111. In United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984), the accused was charged with
weapons smuggling. The defense claimed that the accused suffered from PTSD as a result of
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state should qualify as a severe mental defect or disease given that
the individual's cognitive abilities are completely altered. A disso-
ciative state can be triggered by common stimuli such as the sound
of helicopters flying nearby, the smell of urine, the smell of diesel
fuel, tree lines, the sound of popcorn popping, loud noises, the
sight of Vietnamese people, or the sound of rain." 2 During a flash-
back, a PTSD victim is likely to function in a survivor mode,
which is characterized by altered consciousness, hyperactivity, and
excessive automatic nervous system arousal. 1 3 Typically, during a
flashback a PTSD victim displays survival skills and cognitive ca-
pacities acquired in combat." 4
State v. Cocuzza" 5 exemplifies the PTSD dissociative state de-
fense. The defendant was acquitted under the M'Naghten insanity
test after he had assaulted several policemen with a log.116 The Vi-
etnam combat veteran had suffered a flashback in which he be-
lieved himself in Vietnam and saw the police officers as enemy
soldiers." 7 Police officers testified that the defendant had carried
the log as if it were a rifle, ignored their orders, and appeared to be
in a drunken and incoherent rage as he attacked.""8 Medical ex-
perts testified that Cocuzza knew the nature and quality of his
conduct only in the sense that he was aware that he was attacking
someone. He did not know that his acts were wrong, however, be-
cause he believed he was attacking enemy soldiers." 9
his experiences in a Northern Ireland prison years earlier. Id. at 81. The court noted the
severity issue, but declined to address it in light of the defendant's inexplicable tardiness in
raising the defense. Id. at 82.
112. J. GOODWIN, CONTINUING READJUSTMENT PROBLEMS AMONG VIETNAM VETERANS 18-19
(published by Disabled American Veterans).
113. Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 7, at 73.
114. Id.
115. Ford, In Defense of the Defenders: The Vietnam Vet Syndrome, 19 CRIM L. BULL.
434, 440 (1983) (citing Cocuzza, No. 1484-79 (Super. Ct. Middlesex Cty N.J. 1981)).
116. Id. See Vietnam Veteran Acquitted, Nat'l L.J., June 29, 1981, at 4, col. 3.
117. Ford, supra note 115, at 440.
118. Id. at 439.
119. Id. at 440.
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The PTSD Defense in Military Tribunals
In military tribunals, the PTSD defense has seen little use,120
and appellate decisions addressing PTSD have been few. The best
known case involved the highly publicized court martial of Marine
Private First Class Robert Garwood. 2' Garwood was charged with
treasonous conduct in aiding North Vietnamese forces during the
Vietnam conflict. He pleaded PTSD unsuccessfully as a partial de-
fense, arguing that his North Vietnamese captors had tortured and
brutalized him to the point that he experienced a dissociative reac-
tion.'22 Garwood contended that this reaction negated his percep-
tive and controlling faculties of mental responsibility and rendered
him insane under the test used by the Armed Forces.12 3 A govern-
ment psychiatrist testified that Garwood "possessed the mental ca-
pacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions and to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law."' 24 The court-martial
therefore rejected Garwood's PTSD defense.2 5 The U.S. Navy-
Marine Corps Court of Military Review sustained the trial court's
120. Telephone interview with Major Dale Marvin, Army Defense Appellate Division,
Judge Advocate General Corps (Nov. 1986); telephone interview with Lieutenant Chris
Hayes, Appellate Defense Division, Navy-Marine Corps Appellate Review Activity (Feb. 11,
1987) (one case pending at the trial court level); letter from Captain W.B. Steinbach, United
States Coast Guard (Jan. 28, 1987) (PTSD has never been raised as a criminal defense in
any Coast Guard court-martial).
121. United States v. Garwood, 16 M.J. 863 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983), aff'd, 20 M.J. 148
(C.M.A.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985).
122. In 1979, Garwood returned from Vietnam and was charged with desertion, solicita-
tion of U.S. troops in the field to defect and to refuse to fight, communication and holding
intercourse with the enemy, and misconduct as a prisoner of war. 16 M.J. at 866. The court-
martial found Garwood guilty of assault and of holding intercourse and communication with
the enemy. Id.
123. 16 M.J. at 867. See generally United States v. Frederick, 3 M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1977)
(court rejected M'Naghten/irresistible-impulse standard and adopted ALI test). Under
Frederick, an individual is not responsible for his criminal behavior "if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appre-
ciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law." Id. at 234. For a history of the insanity defense in the military, see Trant, The Ameri-
can Military Insanity Defense: A Moral, Philosophical, And Legal Dilemma, 99 MIL. L.
REV. 1 (1983).
124. 16 M.J. at 867.
125. Id.
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decision,1 26 and Garwood's appellate defense did not raise the
PTSD issue.127
The PTSD defense was raised again in United States v. Cor-
rea.25 The accused had experienced extensive combat12 9 as well as
various emotional stresses during his twenty-month Vietnam duty.
He married a Vietnamese woman and endured the deaths of sev-
eral close friends, including an officer who died in his arms.""0 Cor-
rea's court-martial offenses occurred while he was stationed at the
Defense Language Institute, in California313 and in Vietnam-like
Honduras,132 following a period of marital discord and alcohol re-
lated problems. Twelve months after Correa's conviction at court
martial, Government psychiatrists diagnosed him as suffering from
PTSD as a result of Vietnam combat. 33 Supported by this new
information, Correa appealed his conviction to the Army Court of
Military Review.
The Army Court of Military Review, in an opinion reflecting its
lack of understanding of the PTSD defense, held that the evidence
was insufficient to raise the issue of insanity.134 Instead, the court
reasoned that Correa's involvement in criminal incidents was not
unusual given his voluntary intoxication and his failure to control
126. Id.
127. United States v. Garwood, 20 M.J. 148. (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985).
128. 21 M.J. 719 (A.C.M.R. 1985), pet. denied, 22 M.J. 378 (C.M.A. 1986).
129. Correa's combat awards included the Silver and Bronze Stars, the Purple Heart, and
the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm. List of Army Medals Awarded to Walter
Correa, Motion To Admit Defense Appellate Exhibits A-D, Correa, 21 M.J. 719 (No. CM
446255).
130. Clinical Report on PV1 Walter Correa, Motion To Admit Defense Appellate Exhibits
A-D, at 2, Correa, 21 M.J. 719 (No. CM 446255) [hereinafter Clinical Report].
131. While at the Defense Language Institute, Correa threatened to kill a fellow soldier
and made financial claims for an unauthorized housing allowance. Supplement to Petition
for Grant of Review, at 5, Correa 21 M.J. 719 (No. CM 446255) [hereinafter Supplement].
Correa admitted that he knew right from wrong when he accepted the housing allowance,
but insisted that he had difficulty acting according to what was right due to his Vietnam
combat mentality. Clinical Report, supra note 130, at 6.
132. Correa threatened a soldier with his pistol while he was engaged in a drunken alter-
cation over local women. Clinical Report, supra note 130, at 5. Correa also flew into a rage
and threatened to shoot a soldier who reprimanded him for being too boisterous during a
truck ride. Supplement, supra note 131, at 5-7.
133. Correa, 21 M.J. at 719. Correa's symptoms met all four main criteria for PTSD and
twelve of twelve subcriteria in three areas. Clinical Report, supra note 130, at 6. Correa
regressed back to a Vietnam mentality but did not experience any flashbacks. Id. at 4-5.
134. 21 M.J. at 721.
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his temper.135 Rejecting the PTSD defense, the court relied heavily
on the fact that twelve years had elapsed between Correa's combat
duty and his first PTSD-related offense. Psychiatric evaluations
indicated, however, that during this period Correa had continually
displayed symptoms of PTSD.136 The court also asserted that Cor-
rea's criminal behavior may have been related directly to his alco-
hol problem, but it failed to recognize the connection between alco-
hol abuse and PTSD. 37
Finally, the court noted that even if Correa had been a victim of
PTSD, the expert testimony presented by the defense failed to
show that PTSD satisfied the prerequisites for legal insanity."8 Al-
though three mental health professionals had diagnosed Correa as
suffering from PTSD, none of them had characterized PTSD as a
135. 21 M.J. at 720-21. During the evening of the Honduran barroom altercation, Correa
had consumed four cans of beer, twelve double shots of alcohol, and four single shots.
Clinical Report, supra note 130, at 5.
136. 21 M.J. at 721. Correa reportedly suffered from Vietnam-related nightmares begin-
ning in 1971. These sleep disturbances increased as his marriage began to deteriorate in
1980. He also experienced severe concentration problems in various Army schools. Clinical
Report, supra note 130, at 4.
Clinicians with extensive experience working with combat veterans have found that al-
though PTSD victims may appear to function symptom free for a number of years following
combat, on closer examination they frequently exhibit subtle symptoms of PTSD. Lipkin,
Scurfield & Blank, supra note 10, at 56. According to the American Psychiatric Association
diagnostic manual, "[it] is not unusual . . . for the symptoms to emerge after a latency
period of months or years following the trauma." DSM III, supra note 42, at 237. A 1982
study of active-duty Vietnam veterans indicates that 3.4% of the group suffered from
"chronic" PTSD (that is, they had experienced PTSD in Vietnam and continued to experi-
ence it) and 1.7% of the group suffered from "delayed" PTSD (they had not experienced
PTSD in Vietnam but currently were suffering from it). Stretch, Incidence & Etiology of
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Among Active Duty Army Personnel, 16 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 464, 473 (1986). Some psychiatrists hypothesize that the delayed effect occurs
because veterans block out the war experience. The residual effects of the trauma return
when veterans must deal with close relationships with others, such as family members. Ly-
ons, supra note 11, at C6. Emotional stress tends to contribute to the initiation of PTSD
reactions. Erlinder, supra note 40, at 34.
137. PTSD symptoms often mimic those of alcohol abuse, and alcohol abuse may even be
symptomatic of PTSD. See Erlinder, supra note 40, at 30. Veterans experiencing PTSD
often attempt self-medication to deal with the problem. J. GOODWIN, supra note 112, at 13,
21. The number of Vietnam-era veterans hospitalized for alcohol abuse rose from 13% in
1970 to 31% in 1974. Walker, supra note 5, at 781. The Center for Policy Research 1981
Vietnam veteran study concluded that a significant relationship exists between combat ex-
perience and alcohol and drug abuse. Stretch, supra note 136, at 465.
138. Correa, 21 M.J. at 721.
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
mental disease or defect."3 9 Furthermore, the court noted that one
of these experts had described PTSD as an "unresolved grief reac-
tion."'140 In light of DSM IIIs recognition of PTSD as a mental
disease or defect, the court's reasoning here ignores the current
thinking regarding PTSD.
The latest military appellate decision to deal with PTSD is
United States v. Hagen.'14 Hagen, an Army sergeant, was con-
victed of larceny, sale, attempted sale, and conspiracy to sell gov-
ernment explosives and ammunition. 42 A post-trial sanity board
unanimously determined that Hagen had not possessed sufficient
mental capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings
against him and therefore had been unable to cooperate intelli-
gently in his defense. 43 Based on these findings as well as evidence
that Hagen suffered from PTSD, Hagen's counsel requested a
rehearing. 4 4
The U.S. Army Court of Military Review conceded that Hagen
suffered from PTSD but nonetheless affirmed the verdict and the
sentence. The court relied on Hagen's confession that his motive
had been profit,145 on two pretrial sanity evaluations finding him
competent to stand trial,146 on Hagen's apparently coherent testi-
mony and unimpaired memory at trial, 47 and on the fact that the
board had made its finding of PTSD impairment a full year after
Hagen's trial.148
Although even such renowned warriors as Audie Murphy have
reportedly suffered PTSD-like symptoms following combat exper-
iences, 49 the military has continued to be skeptical of the PTSD
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. No. CM 445028, (A.C.M.R. June 25, 1985), pet. for review granted, 23 M.J. 44,
(C.O.M.A. 1986).
142. Id., slip op. at 1, 2.
143. Id., slip op. at 3.
144. Id.
145. Id., slip op. at 5.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id., slip op. at 6.
149. Audie Murphy, America's most decorated World War H hero, reportedly was
plagued by war-related nightmares and could not sleep without a loaded German pistol
under his pillow. Hendin & Haas, Vietnam Veterans' Trauma, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984,
at E21, col. 3.
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defense. Such skepticism may be attributed to a self-perpetuating
masculine image 150 that views soldiers who do not react well to
combat as weak or cowardly 5' or to a military reluctance to grant
a potential judicial carte blanche to its many combat veterans.
EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS
Expert Testimony
The prerequisites for the use of expert testimony vary with each
jurisdiction, but generally the subject matter of the expert's testi-
mony must be so distinctly related to a scientific or professional
area or occupation that knowledge of it is beyond the ken of lay-
men. 52 The trial judge may allow expert testimony even if the ju-
rors have some generalized knowledge of the subject, provided,
however, such testimony would be useful. 53 The expert testimony
need only be relevant, probative, and helpful to the trier of fact. 5 4
Additionally, the witness must demonstrate the requisite skills,
knowledge, or experience to qualify as an expert.155
150. Howard, The Vietnam Warrior: His Experience, and Implications for Psychother-
apy, 30 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 121, 127 (1976); see generally Eisenhart, You Can't Hack It
Little Girl: A Discussion of the Covert Psychological Agenda of Modern Combat Training,
31 J. Soc. IssuEs 13 (1975) (combat training equates military effectiveness with masculinity);
Faris, The Impact of Basic Combat Training: The Role of the Drill Sergeant, in SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY SERVICE 15 (1976) (basic combat training emphasizes masculinity).
151. An extreme example of military intolerance for warrior weakness is General George
Patton's face-slapping incident involving an apparently shell-shocked soldier in World War
II.
When asked what his trouble was, the man replied, [sic] "It's my nerves," and
began to sob. The General then screamed at him. "What did you say?" He
replied, "It's my nerves, I can't take the shelling anymore." He was still sob-
bing. The General then yelled at him. "Your nerves, Hell, you are just as [sic]
goddam coward, you yellow son of a bitch." He then slapped the man and said,
"Shut up that Goddam crying. I won't have these brave men here who have
been shot seeing a yellow bastard sitting there crying."
C. WHITING, PATTON 43-44 (1970).
152. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13 (3d ed. 1984).
153. Id. See FED. R. EvID. 702 (expert testimony permitted if specialized knowledge wil
"assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue").
154. Raifman, Problems of Diagnosis and Legal Causation in Courtroom Use of Post-




The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984156 amended the federal
rules concerning admissibility of expert testimony. The new rule
prohibits an expert witness from expressing an opinion or making
an inference as to whether a defendant possessed a certain mental
state.157 This rule, which restricts expert testimony to the presen-
tation and explanation of diagnoses-for example, a description of
the characteristics and severity of a mental disease or defect-was
designed to eliminate confusion created by confficting expert testi-
mony on the ultimate issue of insanity to be decided by the trier of
fact.158 The limitation applies not just to the insanity plea but to
any ultimate determination of mental state that is relevant to the
legal issue to be proved. 59 A jury, however, may now specifically
find a defendant "not guilty only by reason of insanity."'160
Courts increasingly have been called on to determine the proper
qualifications for experts offering testimony concerning PTSD. In
Allewalt v. State, 61 a Maryland court held that in order to qualify
as an expert, a witness had to possess "such a degree of knowledge
as to make it appear that his opinion is of some value whether such
knowledge has been gained from observation or experience, stan-
dard books, maps of recognized authority, or any other reliable
sources."
162
Rule 702,163 which is followed by federal, military, and most
state courts, dictates broad criteria for expert witness qualification.
The rule is loosely phrased to allow qualification not only through
156. 18 U.S.C. § 20 (Supp. II 1985).
157. The rule provides:
[n]o expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether
the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto.
FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
158. SENATE REPORT, supra note 70, at 230, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3182, 3412.
159. Id. at 231, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3413. Examples
include premeditation in a homicide case and lack of disposition in entrapment. Id.
160. Id. at 240, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3422. With the exception
of the District of Columbia, previous federal law had no provision for a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity. Id. at 238, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3420.
161. 61 Md. App. 503, 487 A.2d 664 (1985), vacated, 517 A.2d 741 (1986).
162. Id. at 669 (quoting Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 170, 367 A.2d 472, 474 (1976)).
163. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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scientific or technical knowledge, but also through specialized
knowledge held by "skilled" witnesses.'11 The rule thus recognizes
that a witness may gain expertise by experience as well as through
formal training or education.6 5 This expanded definition should
allow the qualification of counselors and social workers as experts
in PTSD.
Despite such broad criteria, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a trial court's refusal to qual-
ify a witness as a PTSD expert because he was not a trained physi-
cian. 6' In United States v. Crosby,'67 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana refused to qualify a
counselor from a storefront veterans' counseling service as an ex-
pert in diagnosing PTSD because it determined that only a quali-
fied physician could make such a diagnosis.'68 Although the wit-
ness held a master's degree in social work, the lower court also
refused to qualify him as an expert because it held that sociology
was irrelevant.6 9 The court of appeals upheld the trial court's de-
cision as within the judge's discretionary power.17
In situations similar to that in Crosby, state court determina-
tions of expert qualification have varied with each judge. In State
v. Sharp,'7 1 a Louisiana court permitted a Veterans Administra-
tion counselor to testify as an expert in social work dealing with
veterans suffering from emotional problems. The court accepted
the counselor's testimony concerning conversations with the de-
fendant about his battlefield experiences. 72 Psychologists testified
as experts in State v. Pettit7 3 and State v. Simonson, ' 7 and a
164. 56 F.R.D. 183, 282 (note to FED. R. EVID. 702).
165. United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907
(1978).
166. United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1076-77.
169. Id. at 1076 n.10.
170. Id. at 1077.
171. 418 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1982).
172. Id. at 1347 n.4.
173. 104 Idaho 601, 661 P.2d 767 (1983).
174. 100 N.M. 297, 669 P.2d 1092 (1983).
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neuropharmacologist testified about a veteran's drug problems in
State v. Cone.175
Other state courts have interpreted expert qualifications more
narrowly. In Wilburn v. State,70 an Arkansas court held that a
social worker who directed a veterans' counseling service was not
qualified to testify whether the defendant was under the influence
of an extreme emotional disturbance during counseling. 171 In a
North Carolina case,78 the court held that a Vietnam veteran
could not testify about his own dissociative episodes since he had
not qualified as an expert and the defense had not presented ex-
pert testimony showing that the witness suffered from PTSD.17 In
State v. Felde,80 the court held that the testimony of a former
operating room nurse about the type of wounds sustained by veter-
ans was irrelevant, and that a person who researched complaints
from Vietnam veterans did not qualify as an expert on the effects
of Agent Orange. i 18 Furthermore, the court did not allow the re-
searcher to testify about his own Vietnam adjustment problems."8 2
Combat Film Footage
Film footage of Vietnam may prove useful in assisting the trier
of fact to appreciate the trauma of combat fully. As with still pho-
tographs, film footage arguably is admissible as a graphic portrayal
of oral testimony. s3 The proponent may establish its reliability
and accuracy through testimony that the film accurately repro-
duces the event as the witness perceived it. 5 4 Films made by or
depicting activities of the accused and films of events in which the
175. 665 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984).
176. 289 Ark. 224, 711 S.W.2d 760 (1986).
177. Id. at 224-5, 711 S.W.2d at 761.
178. State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 337 S.E.2d 786 (1985). The defendant, while being treated
for PTSD, donned his Army fatigues and assaulted an office complex with several weapons
and firebombs. Id. at 789. He struck a nurse on the head with the butt of a rifle, shot four
people, charred four separate areas of the building, and then shot himself in the head with a
.22 caliber pistol. Id. at 789-90.
179. Id. at 801-02.
180. 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982).
181. Id. at 386-87.
182. Id. at 386.
183. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 152, § 214 at 671.
184. Id.
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accused participated are particularly relevant and have strong
prospects for admission. In State v. James,185 the Louisiana Court
of Appeals held that the trial judge had discretion to disallow the
introduction of a commercially produced film. 186 The court noted
that the accused did not appear in the film, the film did not show
combat in which the defendant had participated, and the film's
possible prejudicial effect outweighed any potential probative
value. 187
Intoxication
An issue requiring expert testimony may arise when a defendant
who asserts a PTSD defense was also intoxicated at the time of the
incident. If voluntary intoxication is seen as the cause of the at-
tack, then the PTSD defense may fail. In Commonwealth v.
Plank,8 the court refused to allow a defendant charged with rape
to present an insanity defense based on his chronic alcohol abuse.
The court held that if the "defendant drank voluntarily, the in-
sanity defense is barred because appellant induced the
infirmity."' 89
In Norris v. State,9 0 a drunken Vietnam veteran stabbed a
party host following an argument. A psychiatrist testifying for the
accused stated that even though Norris was intoxicated, he was ex-
periencing a PTSD-related flashback when the stabbing oc-
curred.' 19 The government psychiatrist, however, testified that al-
cohol, combined with the amount of valium Norris had taken,
could have precipitated the stabbing regardless of any flashback.'92
The appellate court upheld Norris' conviction for aggravated
assault.19 3
185. 459 So. 2d 1299 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
186. Id. at 1310.
187. Id.
188. 329 Pa. Super. 446, 478 A.2d 872 (1984).
189. Id. at 875. See Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1057 (1969); Parker v. State, 7 Md. App. 167, 254 A.2d 381 (1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984
(1971).
190. 490 So. 2d 839 (Miss. 1986).
191. Id. at 843.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 841.
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A plausible means of circumventing the voluntary intoxication
bar to the PTSD defense is to argue that drinking problems them-
selves are caused by PTSD. This "involuntary intoxication" argu-
ment may be cast in terms of self-medication of symptoms"" and/
or PTSD-generated psychological need. 195 Empirical data of wide-
spread alcohol problems among Vietnam veteran defendants 9 6
lend support to this theory.
CONCLUSION
American society and the criminal justice system have recog-
nized, belatedly, that a large number of Vietnam veterans are suf-
fering adverse psychological reactions as a result of their exper-
iences in Vietnam.197 This recognition, coupled with the nation's
recovery from the Vietnam experience, has resulted in growing
sympathy in society for the problematic veteran.9 8 This is equally
true in the courtroom."9 Sympathy and sensitivity toward the
problems of the Vietnam veteran may even filter into the military
tribunal as the notion of PTSD gains credibility. For many veter-
ans, these steps are long overdue. Progress has been halting, how-
ever, especially in light of the recent tightening of legal insanity
standards following the insanity acquittal of John Hinkley. 00
Like any other insanity defense, PTSD is vulnerable to abuse.210
Nevertheless, PTSD diagnostic criteria are sufficiently well defined
to enable courts to prevent its manipulation in most cases. One can
only hope that the popular distaste for insanity pleas will not de-
194. See J. GooDWIN, supra note 112 at 121.
195. Id.
196. See supra note 5 and text accompanying note 110.
197. See Suskind, A Jobs Study Reveals a Pattern of Problems Among Veterans of Viet-
nam, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1985, at B1, col. 1.
198. See Franklin, Efforts to Honor Vietnam Veterans Spreading, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10,
1985, at 28, col. 1.
199. "'Those people are combat veterans and hero types,' states Elliot Milstein, an Amer-
ican University law professor and co-director of the National Veterans' Law Center. 'Juries
and judges tend to be sympathetic.'" Burke, supra note 54, at 26, col. 2.
200. See Lefcourt & Becker, supra note 97, at 355.
201. See State v. Simonson, 100 N.M. 297, 669 P.2d 1092 (1983) (prior to shooting, de-
fendant told companion he would claim PTSD insanity); People v. Lockett, 121 Misc. 2d
549, 468 N.Y.S. 2d 802 (1983) (defendant claimed Vietnam-related PTSD but never served
in Vietnam).
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prive Vietnam veterans suffering from PTSD of a legitimate judi-
cial defense.
Michael J. Davidson
